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BEFORE THE
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                       POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS EOARD
                             STATE OF WASHINGTON
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 3
   IN THE MATTER OF
   SCARSELLA BROTHERS, Inc.,
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                                             PCHB No. 1083
                   Appellant,
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                                             FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
           v.
                                             CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
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   PUGET SOUND AIR POLLUTION
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   CONTROL AGENCY,
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                  Respondent,
   STATE OF WASHINGTON,
   DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY,
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                  Intervenor.
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        PER V. A. GISSBERG:
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        This matter, the appeal of the denial of an application for a
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   permit for open burning of wood waste material came on for formal
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   hearing before the Pollution Control Hearings Board (Art Brown,
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   Chairman, W. A. Gissberg and Chris Smith) convened in Seattle on
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   November 29, 1976.
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Appellant Scarsella Brothers, was represented by its attorney,

John D. Blankinship; respondent Puget Sound Air Pollution Control

Agency appeared b, and through its attorney, Keith D. McGoffin;

intervenor Washington State Department of Ecology appeared through its

Assistant Attorney General, Robert V. Jensen.

Having heard the testimony and being fully advised, the Board makes and enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

Ι

Respondent, pursuant to RCW 43.21B.260, has filed with this Board a certified copy of its Regulation I containing respondent's regulations and amendments thereto.

ΙI

Appellant was awarded a contract by the State of Washington for land clearing of over 70 acres of highway right-of-way and the disposal of the wood waste therefrom, estimated by appellant to be 500 tons. Its successful bid was for \$800.00 per acre.

III

Article 8, Section 8.07 of respondent's Regulation I provides in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or allow any outdoor fire for disposal of wood waste generated by:

(1) Federal, state and county land clearing projects generating 500 or more tons of wood waste. . . .

. . . unless the person proposing the outdoor burning has demonstrated to the Control Officer . . . that:

. . . (11) The total cost of disposing of wood waste by means of a certified alternative is greater than that per acre cost specified by the Department of Ecology in WAC 18-12.

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The Department of Ecology had, August 1, 1975 by its admin-

27 | FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1 | 1strative Order, conditionally certified and approved the use of a
2 | Camran air curtain combustion unit. Although the purpose of the
3 | certification was in furtherance of WAC 18-12-110 and 18-12-075, there is
4 | no reference or mention of any "per acre cost" to be found in
5 | WAC 18-12 | notwithstanding the statement to the contrary contained in
6 | respondent's Regulation I. | There is, however, in the order of
7 | certification of the device the following conditional language:

I . . . 4. The use of the air curtain combustion unit is reasonably economical for the types of projects [here involved] . . . when it can be provided without unreasonable delay to a project and subject to the following further conditions:

(a) for projects . . . the total cost of disposing of wood waste by this means including any additional cost to the clearing and grubbing contractor is not greater than \$900.00 per acre.

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Appellant could, under the terms of the order of certification, dispose of the wood waste by conventional open burning by demonstrating that:

III . . . 2. The cost of disposing of wood waste by using a certified alternative will exceed applicable limitations of . . . [\$900 per acre].

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Appellant obtained the bid of one Landmark Corporation which offered to rake the certified Camran device available for disposal of wood waste for a "total cost of \$900.00 per acre." However, the offer required that:

. . . the material should be prepared in a manner similar to that which would be required for an acceptable open burn with the larger stumps split. . . .

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1. Article 8, Section 8.07(2)(11).

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

Since it would cost well over \$400 per acre to prepare the 1 1 2 material for burning (clearing, grubbing, splitting and stacking) appellant certified, on respondent's form, that:

> . . The total cost of . . . disposal . . . using a Certified Alternative, is in excess of . . . (\$900.00) per acre.

and requested that respondent find and determine that appellant had demonstrated (as provided in WAC 18-12-110(2)(c)(ii) that no certified alternate can be used within applicable cost limitations. Respondent refused to do so and advised appellant that it had

. . . not satisfied the requirements of Section 8.07 of Regulation I by demonstrating: The total cost of disposing of wood waste by means of a Certified Alternative is greater than that per acre cost specified by the Department of Ecology in WAC 18-02.

It is from that order that appellant appealed, asking that it be reverse? and that respondent be ordered to grant appellant's application for a permit for open burning.

VI

The Landmark Corporation, apparently the only one authorized to 18 sell the use of the Camran air curtain combustion unit, is not registered as a "contractor" under chapter 18.27 RCW. The Chief of the Contractor's Registration Section of the Department of Labor and Industries has advised the Landmark Corporation that it is "exempt lunder RCW 18.27.010" and hence is not required to register as a |contractor because its function is that of disposing of wood materials that have already been prepared for disposal and would not engage in any activity that physically alters the real estate such as the "removal of stump, excavating or landscaping." (Ex. R-4). 26

27 FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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Any Conclusion of Law hereinafter stated which may be deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings the Pollution Control Hearings Board comes to these

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Ι

The action of the respondent should be reversed and respondent should be ordered to grant appellant's application for a permit for open burning as otherwise provided by the agency's Regulations.

ΙI

The respondent's Regulation, Article 8, Section 8.07, purports to make it unlawful for a person to cause an outdoor fire for disposal of wood waste generated by certain governmental land clearing projects unless that person has demonstrated that

. . . The total cost of disposing of wood waste by means of a certified alternative is greater than that per acre cost specified by the Department of Ecology in WAC 18-12.

That state regulation does not list or indicate the availability of any certified alternate nor does it in any way deal with, indicate, or specify the total per acre cost of disposing of wood waste.

Any regulation, the violation of which may subject one to criminal or civil penalties should not be vague. The respondent's Regulation is vague because neither it nor the Department of Ecology regulation to which it refers provide any dollar figure of per acre cost nor does either regulation make reference to any agency Order from which such vital information can be procured.

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER III

Assuming, however, that a citizen's diligent search does lead him to the Department of Ecology Order which certified the Camran device, that Order is itself fraught with ambiguity and is susceptible of appellant's interpretation of it without straining to reach that result. The fact that extraneous testimony is needed to explain the background of the cost provisions of the Order leads us to conclude that it is also too vague. In short, either the agency or the Department of Ecology regulation should be rewritten.

IV

Vith respect to the Contractor Registration Statute, we believe that the Landmark Corporation falls within the purview of RCW 18.27.010 defining a contractor as

. . . any . . . corporation . . . which, in the pursuit of an independent business undertakes to . . . corstruct . . . for another, any . . . highway

However, that corporation appears to be exempt because of RCW 18.27.090 which provides that:

This chapter shall not apply to: . . . (6) Any . . . alteration of . . . personal property. 2

In <u>Bremeyer</u> the contractor was one clearing standing timber, while in the instant case the contractor is one disposing of personal property (pulled stumps).

V

Any Finding of Fact which should be deered a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

Therefore, the Pollution Control Fearings Board issues this

2. See Bremeyer v. Peter Kiewit, 16 Wn. App. 318 (1976).

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ORDER

1	ORDER
2	This matter is reversed and remanded to respondent for its action
3	on appellant's application for a permit for open burning.
4	DATED this 20th day of December, 1976.
5	POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD
6	Art Braun
7	ART BROWN, Chairman
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9	W. A. GISSBERG, Member
10	See concurring opinion
11	CHRIS SMITH, Member
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6 27	FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 7

Smith, Chris--I concur with the Order, based on Conclusions of Lav II and III, but disagree with Finding of Fact V, lines 1 and 2 (page 4). I would delete lines 1 through 3, substituting:

Appellant testified that \$500 of his \$800 per acre bid represented the cost of clearing, grubbing, and stacking (not including stump splitting). Landmark's bid for waste disposal using the Camran equipment was \$900 per acre. Appellant certified, on respondent's form, that:

I would also add the following Conclusion of Lav:

Landmark's bid meets the test of economic reasonableness, with the exception of its bid requirement for stump splitting, not normally a part of the clearing and grubbing procedure.

Obviously, appellant's bid price is far from sufficient to meet the requirement for use of a certified alternative. It is not clear whether he was aware of such a potential requirement when he responded to the Highway Department bid request; if such notification was lacking, the Board urges its inclusion in all future bid requests.

CHRIS SMITH, Member

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER